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Abstract
We analyze the short-run impact of the introduction of the new statutory minimum
wage in Germany on further training at the workplace level. Applying
difference-in-difference methods to data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we do not
find a reduction in the training incidence but a slight reduction in the intensity of
training at treated establishments. Effect heterogeneities reveal that the negative
impact is mostly driven by employer-financed training. On the worker level, we observe
a reduction of training for medium- and high-skilled employees but no significant
effects on the training of low-skilled employees.
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1 Introduction
In the literature on minimum wages, there has been a long-lasting and still ongoing dis-
cussion on the effects of minimum wages on employment. In their surveys, Brown (1999)
as well as Neumark and Wascher (2007) conclude that most studies until the late 1980s
corroborated the conventional view that minimum wages reduce employment. In the
1990s, a new strand of research in applied microeconometrics failed to detect meaning-
ful negative employment effects. This caused the literature to converge towards a debate
on the size of such—mostly small—employment effects, as well as potential alternative
channels of adjustment within affected firms (see among others, Addison 2017 or Bossler
and Gerner 2016). Bárány (2016) argues that an increase in training might be one of
these adjustment channels and may serve as an explanation for only small disemployment
effects. According to the economic theory, minimum wages could negatively impact the
incentives for employees to realize human capital accumulation due to lower expected
returns from training. Secondly, they could reduce employers’ willingness to finance fur-
ther training as part of cost-saving strategies. In case of non-competitive labor markets,
a counteractive increase in training investments could be used to restore productivity-
dependent rents. Following these arguments, it seems sensible to complement empirical
studies of employment effects (e.g., Bossler and Gerner 2016) with evidence on minimum
wage-induced impacts on training at the workplace level.
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Of the 28 member states of the European Union, 22 have a statutory minimum wage,
while sectoral-specific minimum wages and collective bargaining regimes are used in
the remaining six countries (Schulten 2016). In Germany, the statutory minimum wage
came into force on 1 January 2015 after it was approved in parliament on 11 July 2014.
It is the first compulsory minimum wage that it is valid to all employees with only
minor exemptions.1 The minimum wage was introduced in response to a period of two
decades of a substantial decrease in collective bargaining coverage and an increase in
wage inequality. The new minimum wage is largely binding, and employer expectations
surveyed prior to the minimum wage introduction make adjustments in firm-financed
training likely (Bossler 2017). Based on a biennial suggestion of the newly introduced
minimum wage commission, the minimum wage can be adjusted by a legislative decree
of the German Federal Government. The Minimum Wage Law §9(2) determines that
the commission shall suggest a minimum wage that contributes to an appropriate min-
imum protection of workers and to fair and performing conditions of competition and
does not jeopardize employment. While there is no clear connection between the height
of the minimum wage and the cost of living, the law states that the development of
the minimum wage should align the development of collectively bargained wages in
Germany.
This article studies the minimum wage effects on training in course of an introduction
of a statutory minimum wage in continental Europe. Applying difference-in-differences
estimation techniques to data of the IAB Establishment Panel 2011–2015, the anal-
ysis contributes to the literature on training and minimum wages in three aspects.
First, we present training effects of the new statutory minimum wage in Germany,
which was introduced on 1 January 2015. Second, we can distinguish between three
types of training (external training courses, internal training courses, and training on
the job) and three skill groups (unskilled workers, workers with vocational qualifica-
tions, workers with university degrees). Third, we distinguish between training that is
solely firm-financed and training which includes employee expenditures. The empir-
ical analysis of minimum wage effects on training with establishment data is a use-
ful supplement to investigations of individual data. However, employer-employee data
that include the time period of the German minimum wage introduction are not yet
available.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical aspects presented
in previous literature based on which we formulate empirical hypotheses. Section 3
describes the data and microeconometric methods of our analysis. Section 4 presents the
empirical results including a sample description, the baseline difference-in-differences
results, robustness checks, and effect heterogeneities with respect to sectors, types
of training, the employees’ financial participation at training costs, and training by
qualification levels. Section 5 concludes.
2 Previous literature and hypotheses
In this section, we review theminimumwage literature with respect to effects on training.
The implementation of the statutory minimum wage affects the individuals’ and firms’
training decisions, as it potentially changes the opportunity costs and the gains of train-
ing. According to the standard human capital theory, a large part of human capital is
accumulated on the job. Employees often finance these investments through wage cuts
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since they can internalize future gains from training due to an increased productivity.
However, a binding minimum wage may inhibit the ability of employers to cut wages to
finance training costs (or the firm’s share of training costs). Therefore, the implementation
of minimum wages is predicted to decrease training of low-paid employees.
In the literature, Leighton and Mincer (1981) corroborate this conjecture by show-
ing that US states with a relatively high proportion of low-skilled employees, and thus a
relatively larger applicability of the federal minimum wage, exhibit lower training activ-
ities. Hashimoto (1982) argues that minimum wages enhance labor market competition
through increasing competition for jobs. This, in turn, leads to a reduction in training.
Lazear (1979) estimates the effects of an increase in the minimumwage on training inten-
sity and finds a reduction between 3 to 15% from what it would have been in the absence
of changes in the minimum wage. The negative effect of minimum wages on training is
also supported in studies by Schiller (1994) who analyzes young labor market entrants
that receive less training if they are paid theminimumwage and byNeumark andWascher
(2001) who exploit variation of minimum wages across US states.
Departing from the standard theoretical view that labor markets are competitive,
Acemoglu and Pischke (2003) show that the effect of minimumwages on training depends
on the labor market structure (Additional file 1). In the presence of labor market fric-
tions, firms receive productivity-dependent rents by paying wages below productivity,
i.e., rent = productivity − wage. A binding minimum wage redistributes some fraction
of these rents from employers to employees. Even though training is costly, this creates
an incentive for firms to increase productivity through training in order to restore the
level of rents to some higher level.2 In the empirical part of their article, Acemoglu and
Pischke (2003) use the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the years 1987 to
1992 and measure competitiveness by industry wage differentials and find some weak
evidence that training is positively related to minimum wages among workers in less
competitive sectors.
In line with these theoretical exploitations that minimum wages could in some cir-
cumstances even foster training, Arulampalam et al. (2004) find an increase in workers’
training probability following the introduction of the national minimum wage in Britain.
Their estimates show an increase in the training probability ranging between 8 and 11
percentage points. In another empirical analysis of the minimum wage in Britain, Riley
and Bondibene (2017) show that firms respond to increased minimum wages by the use
of productivity-enhancing HR instruments such as organizational changes and training.
Lechthaler and Snower (2008) contribute by accounting for another theoretical channel
in which minimum wages may limit the internalization of gains from training. As min-
imum wages are theoretically associated with an employment reduction, firms cannot
fully appropriate the gains in form of a higher productivity leading to a reduced incen-
tive for training provision. This is especially the case for low-qualified workers whose
employment is most endangered by minimum wages. Correspondingly, the calibration
exercise by Lechthaler and Snower (2008) demonstrates that an increase in the minimum
wage by 10% reduces training of low-skilled employees by 11.3% but increases training of
medium-skilled employees by 4.1% and high-skilled employees by 1%.
Another strand of literature considers a labor demand-induced impact of minimum
wages on skill formation. Cahuc and Michel (1996) suppose that due to the implemen-
tation of a minimum wage, the wages of low-skilled employees tend to rise relative to
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those of high-skilled labor. Thus, the relative demand for low-skilled employees decreases
while the relative demand for high-skilled employees increases. Consequently, this creates
a labor demand-induced incentive for human capital accumulation of the low-skilled in
order to meet the increased demand for high-skilled employment. However, such human
capital accumulation could be realized outside the workplace on the own initiative of the
employee. Hence, training at the workplace level could disregard the suggested theoreti-
cal channel of an additional human capital accumulation. Moreover, the authors mention
that training subsidies may serve the same objective while avoiding the negative external-
ities such as unemployment, and such subsidies may cover some of both the employees’
and employers’ incentives for additional training. This mechanismmay be relevant in our
case, as the German Federal Government announced an additional budget for training
subsidies for unemployed and employees who are in danger of becoming unemployed
shortly after the minimum wage was introduced.
A related argument is that minimum wages may lead to increasing demand-induced
skill requirements. This increased skill demand is supported in a recent description
by Gürtzgen et al. (2016) who illustrate that skill requirements for vacant minimum
wage positions increased in 2015 after the German minimum wage was introduced.
Hence, employers expect some additional skill accumulation in exchange for paying the
minimum wage.
However, there are also other arguments predicting a decrease of training provision.
First, when firms have a certain budget for personnel expenses, the increased wage
costs have to be compensated by a reduction of some other fringe benefits (Belman
and Wolfson 2014, p. 280). While such a cost reduction could well include several sorts
of benefits, a reduction of training expenses could be one explicit channel to compen-
sate for the increased personnel costs. Second, a more cautious hiring policy among
minimum wage firms may cause training to decrease. The training literature suggests
that newly hired employees typically require training to enable familiarization with
job-specific tasks (Beckmann and Bellmann 2002), and the recent minimum wage liter-
ature in Germany suggests a (modest) employment effect mostly due to a reduction in
hires (Bossler and Gerner 2016). Third, firms may want to encourage employee-initiated
quits to reduce employment. This increased quit rate could be achieved by a reduc-
tion of training provision, which has shown to be associated with an increasing quit rate
(Hübler and König 1999).
In recent empirical work, a reduction in employee turnover induced by minimum
wages has been well documented (e.g., Dube et al. 2016), e.g., explained by the efficiency-
wage theory. Some indications of a turnover-reducing effect in Germany are presented
in Bossler and Gerner (2016). A turnover reduction induces an incentive to employers to
invest in training of workers, as future returns are more likely to be internalized. More-
over, if the minimum wage reduces employee turnover, this also reduces the need to
hire new personnel, which is also associated with higher training investments, as argued
above. Additionally, and as suggested by Lang and Kahn (1998), new hires may be of
higher average quality (i.e., productivity), which in turn may reduce the need for initial
training of newly hired workers. However, some empirical investigations—independent
of minimum wages—point at the opposite mechanism that qualified workers get more
training than others (Dostie 2015, Hübler and König 1999). If this is the case, a minimum
wage-induced change to the workforce composition could lead to an initially uncertain
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effect on training. We address this issue when we control for the workforce composition
and new hires both by levels of qualification in our analysis (Section 4.2).
Finally, some literature discusses direct and indirect effects of training on wages. For
example, Goux and Maurin (2000) use French data and show that the primary effect
of training is a reduction of turnover but not of wages. Zwick (2006) finds that train-
ing increases the productivity but there was no significant rise of wages. This result is
also confirmed by Görlitz (2011), who investigates the short-term impact of on-the-job
training on wages using German linked employer-employee data. Hence, the empirical
literature suggests that training yields a productivity-dependent rent that is not offset by
increased wages.
All these theoretical considerations allow us to derive expectations in the form of
empirical hypotheses. (1) The human capital theory predicts minimum wages to reduce
training. (2) In some circumstances, this pessimistic prediction can be relaxed when
(a) frictions allow for productivity-dependent rents in less competitive labor markets
(Acemoglu and Pischke 2003) or (b) low-skilled employees have a labor demand-induced
incentive to invest in training (Cahuc andMichel 1996). (3) The results by Lechthaler and
Snower (2008) predict a decrease of training for low-skilled workers but amodest increase
of training for medium- and high-skilled employees.
3 Data andmethods
3.1 Data description
The data set of our empirical analysis is the IAB Establishment Panel,3 a large annual
establishment-level survey on personnel developments and personnel policies such as
the provision of training. The survey comprises about 15,000 observations each year and
the gross population consists of all registered establishments located in Germany that
recorded at least one worker covered by the social security system. The sample is rep-
resentative for industries, German states (“Bundesländer”), and differing establishment
size categories.4 The personal interviews are conducted by TNS Infratest Social Research
in face-to-face on-site meetings with a personnel manager of the respective workplace.
This procedure ensures a high data quality and a yearly continuation response rate of
about 80%.
The survey follows establishments over time, and a unique establishment identifier
allows us to construct a panel of workplaces over time covering the period from 2011 to
2015. We start our panel analysis in 2011 after the financial crisis, which marks a starting
point of a period of fairly stable economic development. As the new German minimum
wage was introduced on 1 January 2015, the panel includes four waves ahead of its intro-
duction followed by one treatment year. The post-treatment information was collected in
the 3rd quarter of 2015.
The IAB Establishment Panel surveys a wide range of measures concerning employ-
ers’ training provision. Most importantly and very generally, employers are asked to
give a yes/no response about the incidence of training at the respective plant. Following
this binary distinction, the survey asks for the number of employees who participated
in training activities within the last 6 months.5 This number of trained employees
allows us to construct a measure of training intensity, defined as trained employees
as a fraction of total employment. A second set of questions asks for the types of
training that are used at the respective establishment. This allows us to distinguish
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between training that is provided through external and internal courses as well as on-
the-job training. Similarly, the survey allows a distinction between training that is solely
employer-financed and training that includes a financial contribution by employees
towards the training costs. Finally, a third question directly asks for the number of trained
individuals by three levels of qualification (low, medium, and high). From this informa-
tion, we can construct variables that measure the share of trained employees at each
skill level.
3.2 Empirical methodology
3.2.1 Treatment assignment
For the pre-treatment panel wave of 2014, we have designed a questionnaire module that
allows for a treatment assignment that can be used for a minimum wage evaluation using
difference-in-differences estimation. The data include a measure on whether the respec-
tive workplace was affected by the minimum wage by asking whether at least one worker
received a remuneration below the initial hourlyminimumwage ofe 8.50. A second ques-
tion captures the number of employees receiving an hourly wage below e 8.50 at that
point in time.
From these variables of 2014, we construct a first binary treatment group identifier that
indicates establishments with at least one employee with a remuneration below e 8.50,
which helps to delineate between treated and control plants. A second variable measures
the treatment intensity from the fraction of affected employees. This creates a bite mea-
sure with a stronger weight on workplaces with larger fractions of affected employees.
Both treatment variables are calculated from 2014 data but can be traced back and forth
across panel years for the respective establishments. This sample construction results in
an analysis sample of plants that existed in 2014.
3.2.2 Empirical approach
We structure our empirical analysis as follows. Before estimating difference-in-
differences specifications, we present descriptive statistics that characterize our data
sample as well as differences between the treatment group and the control group from
ahead of the minimum wage introduction in 2014. In the main part of our analysis, we
present treatment effects not only from difference-in-differences estimations but also
from specifications that include time-varying control variables.
In the baseline difference-in-differences estimation, the measure for training (training
incidence, training intensity) is regressed on the interaction of the treatment variable and
a post minimum wage indicator:
trainingit = (treatment groupi · D2015t)δ + θi + τt + it , (1)
where treatment group is either the binary treatment variable or the intensity treatment.
The effect on the treatment group and treatment time interaction δ captures the treat-
ment effect of theminimumwage introduction on the treated establishments. In the base-
line specification, θi is a vector of time-constant firm-specific fixed effects that control for
all constant differences in training between establishments (see, e.g., Hsiao 2003). Hence,
it also controls for constant differences between the treatment and the control group,
which is required in difference-in-differences specifications (Lechner 2010). Finally, τt
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captures time fixed effects that are common to all establishments, which we opera-
tionalize by dummy variables for each year in the panel data, and it is an idiosyncratic
error term.6
When we estimate effects conditional on covariates, we simply add a vector of time-
varying control variables xit to the baseline specification:
trainingit = (treatment groupi · D2015t)δ + x′itβ + θi + τt + it. (2)
Although the presented estimates are retrieved from fixed effect specifications, they can
be replicated using differences-in-differences specifications with a time-constant control
variable for the treatment group using OLS or random effects estimation. However, the
Breusch-Pagan test points at the importance of time-invariant firm effects in our analysis
and the Hausman test shows that such firm effects are correlated with our time-varying
variables of interest.7
Finally, and despite the use of linear probability models, we can also replicate our results
using non-linear panel estimators that control for time-constant heterogeneity. Such
approaches include the Mundlak estimator (Mundlak 1978), in which the firms effects θi
are modeled by time averages (θi = x¯′iπ + wi), and the van Praag estimator (van Praag
2015), which additionally replaces xit by (xit − x¯i).8
We round off our empirical analysis by estimating several effect heterogeneities using
the baseline specification. In a first step, we estimate the difference-in-differences effect
for competitive and non-competitive sectors. In a second step, we re-estimate the baseline
specification while looking at alternative definitions of the endogenous training vari-
able, yielding effects on (a) tree types of training, (b) training with and without financial
participation of employees at the training costs, and (c) training by skill levels of the
employees.
4 Empirical analysis and results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The analysis sample and the variables of interest are described in Table 1. In total, we con-
sider 58,209 establishment observations over the period from 2011 to 2015. Most of the
training outcomes that we analyze contain only few observations with missing informa-
tion. Two exceptions are the training by skill levels, which was not included in the 2012
survey, and the distinction by financial participation in training costs, which was only
included in the surveys of 2011, 2013 and 2015.With respect to the treatment assignment,
the descriptives show that 15% of the establishment observations are treated, implying
that 85% of the observations are in the control group of unaffected plants.
Wemeasure the training incidence as a binary indicator and the training intensity as the
share of trained employees that were subject to training in the first half of the respective
year. As we see from the sample averages, 70% of the workplaces in Germany provided
some sort of training to at least one of the employees. Across all establishments, 32% of
all employees participated in training. While the intensity of training among the medium
qualified employees was especially high, this is mostly due to the fact that this group
constitutes the largest group of employees in Germany. Training can be realized with
or without financial participation of employees. While we exclude establishments with-
out a clear assertion in this respect, the sample averages clearly show that the training is
financed by employers in most cases. A final distinction is made by types of training. We
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the total sample
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Treatment assignment:
Treatment group 58,209 0.146 0.353 0 1
Intensity treatment 58,209 0.053 0.168 0 1
Training incidence (dummies):
Training 58,174 0.696 0.460 0 1
Training intensity (shares):
Training 56,509 0.318 0.341 0 1
Training of low qualified 44,160 0.026 0.101 0 1
Training of medium qualified 45,994 0.240 0.292 0 1
Training of high qualified 44,829 0.051 0.139 0 1
Worker-financed training 31,080 0.068 0.206 0 1
Firm-financed training 31,080 0.245 0.326 0 1
External courses 56,470 0.278 0.332 0 1
Internal courses 56,470 0.228 0.330 0 1
On-the-job training 56,470 0.220 0.326 0 1
Explanatory variables:
Share of medium qualified 58,209 0.590 0.276 0 1
Share of high qualified 58,209 0.097 0.190 0 1
Hiring rate 58,209 0.057 0.116 0 1
Skilled hiring rate 58,209 0.038 0.087 0 1
Collective bargaining 58,124 0.428 0.495 0 1
Works council 58,121 0.284 0.451 0 1
Lagged employment (in logs) 58,209 3.094 1.707 0 10.98
Part-time fraction 57,546 0.268 0.269 0 1
Technical level of capital 58,021 2.787 0.763 1 5
(1 = outdated,..., 5 = novel)
High competitive pressure 58,209 0.352 0.316 0 1
Data source: IAB Establishment Panel 2011–2015, analysis sample
distinguish between external courses, internal courses, and on-the-job training.9 The lat-
ter comprises on-the-job training in terms of job rotation, quality circles, and self-learning
programs.
In conditional estimations of the difference-in-differences specification, we consider a
large set of control variables. To account for potential changes in the workforce compo-
sition, we account for the workforce composition by levels of qualification. Moreover, we
control for the hiring of new workers by skill levels, as newly hired workers may receive
some initial training. Looking at other (more structural) firm-level characteristics, the
description displays that 43% of the plants are covered by collective bargaining, and 28%
report worker representation through a works council. Concerning the workforce com-
position, 27% of the employees are part-time workers, which is relevant as these are less
likely to participate in training. We also account for the self-reported technical levels of
capital and competitive pressure.
Table 2 displays descriptive differences of the variables by treatment status. While
we did not have concrete expectations concerning descriptive differences in training,
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Table 2 Testing differences between treatment and control group in 2014
Treatment group (t–i) Control group (t–i) Difference
Mean sd Mean sd
Training incidence (dummies):
Training 0.591 0.492 0.703 0.457 −0.112***
Measures for training intensity (shares):
Training 0.254 0.330 0.336 0.348 −0.082***
External courses 0.212 0.314 0.298 0.342 −0.086***
Internal courses 0.177 0.309 0.240 0.340 −0.063***
On-the-job training 0.178 0.306 0.233 0.335 −0.055***
Worker-financed training 0.052 0.179 0.069 0.205 −0.018***
Firm-financed training 0.179 0.298 0.243 0.321 −0.064***
Training of low qualified 0.040 0.135 0.026 0.099 0.014***
Training of medium qualified 0.190 0.274 0.251 0.298 −0.061***
Training of high qualified 0.021 0.087 0.056 0.149 −0.035***
Covariates:
Share of medium qualified 0.542 0.306 0.585 0.280 −0.043***
Share of hight qualified 0.041 0.113 0.101 0.197 −0.060***
Hiring rate 0.084 0.146 0.057 0.120 0.027***
Skilled hiring rate 0.041 0.091 0.039 0.093 0.002
Collective bargaining 0.227 0.419 0.446 0.497 −0.219***
Works council 0.139 0.346 0.295 0.456 −0.156***
Lagged employment (in logs) 3.005 1.520 3.045 1.757 −0.040
Part-time fraction 0.377 0.298 0.264 0.268 0.113***
Technical level of capital 2.600 0.807 2.809 0.768 −0.208***
High competitive pressure 0.140 0.347 0.112 0.315 0.029***
Sample averages by treatment status before treatment in 2014. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel 2014. For the measures of
training by financial participation of employees, we use data of 2013 as this information was not included in the 2014’s panel wave
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10
almost all variables that measure training in some qualitative way indicate a lower aver-
age training provision in treated compared to untreated establishments. An exception
is the training of low qualified employees, which is initially higher at treated establish-
ments. A t test shows that most bivariate mean differences are statistically significant at
a 1% significance level. These descriptive differences suggest that employees (except the
low qualified employees) at affected plants were less likely to have participated in training
measures ahead of the minimum wage introduction.
Also with respect to other observable variables, Table 2 reveals some meaningful dif-
ferences between treatment and control groups in 2014. The treatment group is more
likely to be covered by a collective bargaining agreement and less likely to possess a works
council. Moreover, we observe some other typical differences: treated plants show a larger
share of part-time employment, have a relatively outdated technical capital infrastruc-
ture, and face higher competitive pressure. As all these observable variables may also
be correlated with the provision of training, we use them as controls for a robustness
check that presents difference-in-differences estimates conditional on covariates. Finally,
Bellmann et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2017) 6:8 Page 10 of 22
Table 2 does not show significant differences in the hiring rate of skilled workers and the
firm size measured by the number of employees.
4.2 Difference-in-differences estimation
Difference-in-differences estimates in Table 3 allow us to interpret the effect of the min-
imum wage introduction on training. The estimated coefficients are treatment effects as
depicted by the δ-coefficient in equation (1), which is the effect of the treatment group–
treatment time interaction. While Panel A displays effects on the training incidence, i.e.,
whether the firm provides training at all, Panel B presents effects on the training intensity,
i.e., the fraction of trained employees in the respective establishment.
The effects of the minimum wage introduction on training incidence are small and
insignificantly different from zero for both the binary treatment definition and the inten-
sity treatment. The results imply that there is no effect on the very general decision
whether or not to provide training to at least one employee. The validity of this conclu-
sion is supported by the two placebo regressions in columns (2) and (4), which omits data
from 2015 and artificially assigns treatment to observations of 2014.
Looking at the effect of the minimum wage on training intensity, Panel B reveals a
negative impact of −0.018 from the binary treatment variable, implying that the mini-
mum wage reduced training by 1.8 percentage points at treated workplaces. This effect
is supported by the negative and significant impact in column (3). The effect size implies
Table 3 Difference-in-differences estimates on training
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Dependent variable is the training incidence
DiDbinary treatment −0.003
(0.011)
DiDbinary placebo 0.004
(0.009)
DiDintensive treatment 0.0001
(0.022)
DiDintensive placebo −0.003
(0.021)
Panel B: Dependent variable is the training intensity (share of trained employees)
DiDbinary treatment −0.018**
(0.008)
DiDbinary placebo −0.005
(0.007)
DiDintensive treatment −0.041***
(0.015)
DiDintensive placebo −0.020
(0.014)
Observations 56,509 44,794 56,509 44,794
Difference-in-differences estimates with firm- and time-specific fixed effects. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
(clusters are on the level of establishments). Dependent variables are describes in the titles of Panels A and B, where “training
incidence” is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when firms provide training and 0 otherwise, and “training intensity” is a
variable capturing the fraction trained employees (in the respective year) as of all employees. Data source: IAB Establishment
Panel 2011–2015, analysis sample
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10
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that the training intensity decreases by 0.4 percentage points for a 10 percentage points
increase in the fraction of affected employees. The placebo tests in columns (2) and (4)
are insignificantly different from zero supporting such negative effects. However, the neg-
ative sign of such placebo estimations points at the possibility of a trend towards lower
training provision that may be independent of the introduction of the minimum wage. As
parallel trends between the treatment group and the control group in the absence of the
treatment is a crucial assumption for difference-in-difference estimates, we devote the
next subsection to the inspection of trend differences.
As a first robustness check to the baseline effects, we estimate the minimumwage effect
on the training intensity from conditional difference-in-differences specifications. This is
particularly relevant as the workforce composition may change due to the minimumwage
if firms hire more qualified workers (Lang and Kahn 1998), which may or may not require
a different intensity of training. Table 4 controls for such covariates, where columns (1)
and (5) control for the workforce composition by qualification levels only. While the
results corroborate the conjecture that highly qualified employees receive more training,
the effect of theminimumwage remains unchanged. In columns (2) and (6), we control for
Table 4 Conditional difference-in-differences estimates on the training intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: training intensity (share of trained employees)
DiDbinary treatment −0.018*** −0.018** −0.018** −0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
DiDintensive treatment −0.043*** −0.044*** −0.043*** −0.042***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Share high skilled 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.086***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Share medium skilled 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.047***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Hiring rate −0.028 −0.013 −0.016 −0.029 −0.013 −0.016
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Skilled hiring rate 0.050** 0.023 0.021 0.050** 0.024 0.021
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Collective bargaining 0.012** 0.012**
(0.006) (0.006)
Works council 0.009 0.009
(0.011) (0.011)
Lagged employment −0.012 −0.012
(logarithmic) (0.008) (0.008)
Part-time share −0.021** −0.021**
(0.011) (0.011)
Technical level 0.009*** 0.009***
of capital (0.002) (0.002)
High competition −0.010* −0.010*
(0.005) (0.005)
Observations 55,612 55,612 55,612 55,612 55,612 55,612 55,612 55,612
Additional controls as indicated by the respective coefficients. All other notes as in Table 3. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel
2011-2015, analysis sample
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.10
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the general hiring rate as well as the hiring rate of qualified employees. The results show
some indication that the hiring rate exerts a negative impact on training while the hiring
of qualified employees has a positive impact, again the effect of the minimum wage on
training remains unchanged. Very similar results are obtained form columns (3) and (7),
where the estimations control for the workforce composition and the hiring rates. These
results suggest that the effect of the minimum wage on training is not simply driven by
the mechanism that the minimum wage changes the workforce through hiring different
kinds of workers.
We additionally control for some more structural firm-level information in columns
(4) and (8). While this conditioning has the advantage of controlling for potentially con-
founding covariates, it carries the risk of controlling for potentially endogenous factors.
Additional control variables are collective bargaining coverage, works council represen-
tation, the fraction of part-timers, the technical level of capital, and an indicator for high
competitive pressure. Suchlike the baseline estimates, both specifications show a nega-
tive and significant treatment effect of the minimum wage introduction on the share of
trained employees, which in size remains virtually unchanged.
As treatment effectsmay vary by firm size, we test effect heterogeneities by firm size cat-
egories. We construct interaction variables between the treatment variable and firm size
dummies, where we consider three firm size classes measured by the number of employ-
ees: FS1 ≤ 5, 6 ≤ FS2 < 250 and FS3 ≥ 250. Using control variables as in columns (4)
and (8), we find
βDiD_binary treatment · FS1 = −0.018(0.015)
βDiD_binary treatment · FS2 = −0.015(0.009)
βDiD_binary treatment · FS3 = −0.042 ∗ ∗(0.020)
βDiD_intensive treatment · FS1 = −0.030(0.026)
βDiD_intensive treatment · FS2 = −0.050 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.019)
βDiD_intensive treatment · FS3 = 0.002(0.055),
where cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. Under binary treatment the inter-
action effect is only significant for large establishments. The picture changes when we
consider the intensive treatment definition. In such regressions, middle-sized establish-
ments have the strongest negative treatment effect. The influence on smaller and larger
firms turns insignificant.
4.3 Inspecting the parallel trends assumption
Even though the placebo effects of the baseline specification in Table 3 fall short of sta-
tistical significance, they may point at a divergence of trends between the treatment and
the control group. As parallel trends are a crucial assumption for difference-in-differences
estimation, we devote this subsection to the inspection of group-specific trends, and we
apply estimation strategies that have been proposed in the literature to deal with the
divergence of trends in difference-in-differences estimation.
Figure 1 illustrates the average use of training for treated and control establishments in
our analysis sample. Despite some year-specific variation in the data that is independent
of the two groups, the unconditional illustration in Panel a questions the parallel trends
assumptions by revealing a relative decline in the training intensity among the group of
treated establishments. While this development can be seen as an interesting finding in
itself, it may be independent of the introduction of the minimum wage.
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Fig. 1 Inspection of parallel trends between treatment and control group. a The trends of training by
treatment status before propensity score matching. b The trends of training by treatment status for the
treatment group and the matched control group, which is defined by radius matching. Source: IAB
Establishment Panel, 2011–2015, analysis sample
To shed light on the presence of a treatment effect irrespective of a divergence in the
group-specific training trends, we add a term that captures treatment group and time-
specific heterogeneity to our empirical model of interest:
trainingit = (treatment groupi · D2015t)δ + θi + τt + treatment group,t + it (3)
The treatment group and time-specific heterogeneity is specified by treat group,t. As
treatment group,t may correlate with the treatment effect interaction of interest, we attempt
to control for this additional heterogeneity using two different approaches.
As a first attempt, we follow previous literature by Addison et al. (2015), Allegretto et al.
(2011), and Neumark et al. (2014) who suggest to control for such treatment group
and time-specific heterogeneities directly by the use of parametric trends. Following
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this argument, we specify such treatment group-specific trends as treatment group,t =
Tt ∗ treatment groupi ∗ ψ , where Tt represents a count variable for each panel wave and
treatment groupi indicates treated plants. The trend term is included to the baseline spec-
ification as formulated in equation (3), where ψ estimates the treated establishments’
trend divergence from the control group, exploiting time variation from before the min-
imum wage introduction. As this imposes the assumption that the trend divergence is
linear, we additionally check alternative—more flexible—specifications of such trends by
the use of quadratic and cubic polynomials, i.e.,
treatment group,t = Tt ∗ treatment groupi ∗ ψ1 + T2t ∗ treatment groupi ∗ ψ2
treatment group,t = Tt ∗ treatment groupi ∗ ψ1 + T2t ∗ treatment groupi ∗ ψ2
+T3t ∗ treatment groupi ∗ ψ3
The treatment effect of the regressions that control for treatment group-specific trends
are displayed in Table 5. The binary and the intensive treatment effects shrink to about
one percentage point. Additionally, in such specifications the standard errors increase, as
the specification leaves little time variation for identification of the true treatment effect.
Hence, all point estimates turn insignificant. However, we can also emphasize that the
point estimates remain negative and robust in all such trend specifications, pointing at a
negative treatment effect of the minimum wage introduction that quantifies a decrease in
training by one percentage point.
In a second attempt, we control for the group-specific time heterogeneity
treatment group,t by the use of a matching procedure that compares treated establish-
ments with control establishments conditional on pre-treatment developments in train-
ing, i.e., conditional on pre-treatment developments in the outcome variable. In the
matching procedure, we want to compare establishments with similar levels of train-
ing in 2014 as well as similar growth rates in training 2011–2012, 2012–2013 and
2013-2014.
For this purpose, we use a propensity score matching (PSM) that allows us to equalize
pre-treatment trends as illustrated in Panel b of Fig. 1.10 PSM requires estimation of the
propensity score p(x) that represents the probability to be treated for each establishment
Table 5 Treatment effects controlling for treatment group-specific trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable is the training intensity (share of trained employees)
DiDbinary treatment −0.006 −0.008 −0.002
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014)
DiDintensive treatment −0.012 −0.010 −0.011
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
Linear trends x x x x x x
Quadratic trends x x x x
Cubic trends x x
Observations 56,509 56,509 56,509 56,509 56,509 56,509
Treatment group-specific time trends are specified as indicated in the respective columns. All other notes as in Table 3. Data
source: IAB Establishment Panel 2011–2015, analysis sample
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in the data, which is an estimation of the treatment group identifier on the pre-treatment
training level and pre-treatment growth rates of training as explanatory variables. Based
on this prerequisite estimation, the treatment effect on the treated establishments can be
formalized as follows:
ATTPSM = 1Ntreated
∑
i∈Ntreated
[
2015−14trainingi − ̂
2015−14trainingM(i)|p(x)] (4)
where the outcome of interest is the growth in the training intensity (share of trained
employees) from 2014 to 2015. For each treated establishment i, this outcome variable
is compared with a group of establishments from the control group, i.e., close matches
defined as M(i), where the match-defining proximity is evaluated from the propensity
score p(x). The difference between the average of the treated establishments’ training
growth and matched control group’s average training growth defines the treatment effect
on the treated establishments.
The estimates in Table 6 present the average treatment effects on the treated estab-
lishments based on the propensity score matching procedure in equation (4), where the
group of similar matches is defined by radius matching with a caliper of 0.03 percent-
age points. From a visual inspection of the pre-treatment trends of the treatment and
the control group in Panel b of Fig. 1, this procedure serves to equalize trends, but it is
insensitive to the point estimate of interest.11 The effect in column (1) reveals a reduc-
tion in training by about −2.9 percentage points. A crucial assumption for propensity
score matching is sufficient common support, i.e., a sufficiently large number of control
establishments that are similar compared with their treated counterparts. As a robust-
ness check, we follow the suggestion by Imbens (2015) and use a trimming procedure
that reduces the analysis sample based on the support in the propensity score. In fact,
we exclude 5% of the treated establishments whose propensity score has the least num-
ber of similar controls. The respective estimate is presented in column (2). As the point
estimate remains unchanged, the trimming of the treatment group does not affect our
results.
As the application of propensity score matching requires a binary treatment assign-
ment, we cannot directly use the intensity treatment in our PSM. However, we follow a
suggestion by Imbens andWooldridge (2009) in using two separate binary treatments, dif-
Table 6 Treatment effects of a radius matching on pre-treatment trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable is the training intensity (share of trained employees)
ATTbinary treatment −0.029*** −0.029***
(0.010) (0.009)
ATTlow treatment intensity −0.026**
(0.010)
ATTlow treatment intensity −0.034*
(0.018)
Establishments 6724 6703 6453 5958
ATT is the average treatment effect on the treated. Dependent variables is the “training intensity” capturing the fraction trained
employees (in the respective year) as of all employees. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel 2011–2015
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10
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fering in their treatment intensity (more or less than 50% of the employees were affected
by the minimum wage introduction). We use both treatments in separate estimations
and exclude observations marked by the alternative definition respectively. The results in
columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 reveal an effect on training which is slightly larger for the
group of more severely affected establishments.
In total, the treatment effects from PSM reveal a robust negative effect on training,
while providing an effective strategy to equalize pre-treatment trends. Combined with
the baseline panel estimates in Tables 3 and 4 and the parametrization of group-specific
trends in Table 5, the effect of the minimum wage introduction on training is in the range
between −1 and −3 percentage points.
4.4 Effect heterogeneities
In what follows, we present heterogeneities of the effect of the minimum wage introduc-
tion on training. First, we estimate separate effects for competitive and non-competitive
sectors. Thereafter, we use different outcome variables to estimate effects on three dif-
ferent types of training, on training with and without financial participation by the
employees and on training by levels of qualification.
4.4.1 Sectoral differences
We first present separate treatment effects for groups of sectors by competitiveness.12
In contrast to the standard human capital theory, the contribution by Acemoglu and
Pischke (2003) shows that effects of minimum wages on training can be positive when
labor markets are less competitive, i.e., when rents are prevalent in the market. As
these rents are productivity-dependent, employers have an incentive to restore such
rents by increasing the productivity through training. Minimum wages would oth-
erwise redistribute the rents to the employees’ side. In situations without minimum
wages, it is less likely that the establishments attempt to enlarge rents via productivity-
enhancing training without an employees’ participation. This would be considered as
unfair and would probably have negative consequences for the firm by reactions of the
employees.
Table 7 shows that the adverse effect of the minimum wage introduction on training
is much stronger in competitive than in less competitive sectors. Looking at the inci-
dence of training, we observe significant effects for competitive sectors while the effect
for non-competitive sectors is insignificant. When we view the training intensity, we
find insignificant effects in both sectors but the negative coefficient is absolutely larger
in competitive sectors. Our results do not support the prediction that minimum wages
positively affect training in less competitive sectors (here services). However, we cannot
exclude that under weak competition, the negative minimum wage effect on training is
reduced.
4.4.2 Types of training
The data provide us with information on the types of training at the respective establish-
ments allowing a distinction between external courses, internal courses, and on-the-job
training. We use this information as separate outcome variables in separate regressions.
Table 8 demonstrates that the introduction of the minimumwage reduces the training for
all three types. No systematic differences can be observed.
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Table 7 Treatment effects on training in competitive and non-competitive sectors
Dependent variable is the training intensity (share of trained employees)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competitive sectors Non-competitive sectors
DiDbinary treatment −0.038*** −0.002
(0.013) (0.013)
DiDintensive treatment −0.039 −0.032
(0.026) (0.024)
Observations 17,492 17,492 15,121 15,121
The definition of competitive and non-competitive sectors is described in footnote 6. Further notes as in Table 3. Data source: IAB
Establishment Panel 2011–2015
4.4.3 Financial participation of the employees
Wenow differentiate by training that is purely employer-financed and training with finan-
cial participation of the employees. Workers who themselves contribute to training by
financial participation view training especially as a long-run mean of climbing the career
ladder. They are investing in their future jobs and income streams. However, from the
workers’ perspective, the minimum wage induces an incentive to reduce training activ-
ities as marginal returns could be reduced when the minimum wage compresses the
wage distribution or when workers expect a permanent wage compression such that skill
premiums become less pronounced. On the other hand, employees may face a demand-
induced incentive for skill accumulation (Cahuc and Michel 1996). Hence, the effect
on employee-financed training is theoretically ambiguous. By contrast, employers have
a clear cost-reducing incentive and are therefore predicted to decrease firm-financed
training activities.
Table 9 demonstrates negative effects on the training incidence and the training inten-
sity when it is purely firm-financed. However, we do not observe any significant effect on
training that is completely or at least partially financed by employees. This result is in line
with the theoretical expectation that employers try to reduce costs of training. Employees
may still have an incentive to invest in human capital accumulation through training, and
therefore, they participate in training costs if they are not financially constrained.13
Table 8 Separate treatment effects on types of training
Dependent variable is the training intensity (share of trained employees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
External courses Internal courses On-the-job External courses Internal courses On-the-job
DiDbinary treatment −0.013* −0.016** −0.014*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
DiDintensive treatment −0.033** −0.026* −0.038***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 56,470 56,470 56,470 56,470 56,470 56,470
Dependent variables are the shares of trained employees with access to the types of training indicated by column titles. Training
“on-the-job” includes training on-the-job in the narrow sense, quality circles, job rotation, and self-learning programs. Further
notes as in Table 3. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel 2011-2015, analysis sample
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.10
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Table 9 Treatment effects on training by financial participation at training costs
Dependent variable is the training intensity (share of trained employees)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial participation Firm financed Financial participation Firm financed
DiDbinary treatment −0.003 −0.015*
(0.007) (0.009)
DiDintensive treatment −0.017 −0.033*
(0.011) (0.017)
Observations 31,080 31,080 31,080 31,080
Financial participation implies that the training is either fully or partially financed by the employees. Further notes as in Table 3.
Data source: IAB Establishment Panel 2011, 2013 and 2015. Training by financial participation of the employees was not included
in 2012 and 2014
4.4.4 Effects by workers’ qualification
Finally, the IAB Establishment Panel contains information on whether the participants in
training were unskilled workers, workers with a vocational certificate, or employees with
a university degree have participated in training. This distinction allows us to add to the
literature, where effects on training are mostly analyzed irrespective of the workers’ initial
education. The relevance draws on the possibility that firms may change the provision of
training not only for low-qualified minimum wage workers but they may also adjust the
provision of training measures for skilled personnel in order to compensate for the costs
induced by the minimum wage.
However, we cannot distinguish between treated and untreated workers by skill levels.
Hence, we have to be cautious when relating skills groups to the minimum wage. Nev-
ertheless, we can estimate the reduced form effect of the minimum wage introduction
on the training by skill groups. If the respective treatment effect on unskilled workers is
negative, this could imply that
• Training is reduced for minimum wage affected and unaffected unskilled workers
• Training of affected workers increases and that of unaffected workers decreases,
where the latter effect overcompensates the former
• Training of non-affected workers increases and that of affected workers decreases,
where the latter overcompensates the former.
The effects in Table 10 do not show statistically significant effects on the training inci-
dences for low and medium qualified workers (columns 1 to 2). This could be due to
the fact that qualification decisions are involved in long-term considerations. However,
it is interesting to note that the training incidence and intensity of high-skilled workers
decreases—see columns (3) and (6). The latter effect is also observed formedium qualified
employees—see column (5)—while the effect is insignificant for the low-skilled workers.
Whatmight explain these effect differences? One possibility is that the previous training
of workers with a university degree or a vocational certificate was much more intensive,
so that a temporary reduction for these groups is less important. From a theoretical per-
spective, it seems plausible because the minimum wage induces an incentive for human
capital accumulation among the least skilled, as the relative labor demand shifts towards
relatively more skilled workers (see Section 2). This pressure to invest in training at the
employees’ side contrasts the cost-saving argument on the employers’ side, such that
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Table 10 Treatment effects on training by skill levels of employees
Dependent variable is the training intensity (share of trained employees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low qualified Medium qualified High qualified Low qualified Medium qualified High qualified
DiDbinary treatment −0.003 −0.010 −0.004**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.002)
DiDintensive treatment −0.011 −0.026** −0.005**
(0.008) (0.012) (0.002)
Observations 44,160 45,994 45,388 44,160 45,994 45,388
Notes as in Table 3. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2015. The differentiation by skill level was not
included in the 2012’s panel wave
an insignificant effect seems plausible. Once more, we should emphasize that training
decisions are based on long-term considerations and insofar not all effects can be cap-
tured in the first post-reform year, especially because the substitution between skilled
and unskilled is highly expansive. Nevertheless, we believe that long-term oriented estab-
lishments start early with adjustment measures, as this is advantageous over reluctant
behavior.
Another contrasting argument may be that training activities are increased for low-
skilled hires because of a rise in skill demand for vacancies paid at the level of the
minimum wage (Gürtzgen et al. 2016). It seems plausible that the respective applicants
have to finance the acquisition of these skills if they cannot supply a sufficiently high pro-
ductivity. However, as the data do not include information on the financial burden of
training costs by skill levels, we cannot rule out employer-financed training for such hires.
5 Conclusions
We analyze effects of the introduction of the new statutory minimum wage on firm-
level training in Germany. Human capital theory predicts that binding minimum wages
prohibit wage cuts that are used by employers to finance training. If training costs are
not offset by an increase in productivity, firms have to cut training costs. However, this
pessimistic prediction can be relaxed when labor market frictions allow for productivity-
dependent rents (Acemoglu and Pischke 2003). Moreover, an increase of relative demand
for skilled workers may induce an incentive for human capital accumulation.
We apply a difference-in-differences estimation to data from the IAB Establishment
Panel, a panel data set with comprehensive information on training and the bite of the
minimum wage. The results do not provide evidence for a decrease in training incidence.
However and more importantly, we find fairly robust evidence for a decrease in the train-
ing intensity (i.e., share of trained employees) in establishments affected by the minimum
wage. The estimated effects of the binary treatment on the training intensity is roughly
−1.8 percentage points across all specifications, including estimations with and without
covariates. Under the consideration of an intensive treatment variable, the percentage
point effect ranges between −0.039 and −0.041. Moreover, we find robust effects on dif-
ferent types of training, indicating that the reduction in training is not compensated by a
change in the quality of such training.
When we estimate separate effects for rather competitive and non-competitive
sectors, we find that the negative effects on the training intensity are driven by
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competitive sectors, whereas the effect in non-competitive sectors remains incon-
clusive. This effect heterogeneity corroborates predictions by Acemoglu and Pischke
(2003) who have shown that market frictions and productivity-dependent rents
can, in fact, allow for a positive effect of minimum wages on training. We also
demonstrate that the minimum wage mostly affected employer-financed training but
not training that is at least partially financed by employees. We conclude that
employers have a minimum wage induced incentive to cut training costs when
they cannot devise improved training regimes that would provide net productiv-
ity increases. The employees’ incentives for human capital accumulation seem to be
unchanged.
We finally present separate effects by skill groups. The results show that the effect is
mostly driven by a reduction of training for medium and highly qualified employees.
While this is at odds with predictions by Lechthaler and Snower (2008), it could well be
that employers cannot further risk a diminishing productivity of low-skilled employees,
and in contrast, they are able to cut training costs of employees that are typically not
concerned by minimum wages.
As a caveat concerning our analysis, we should stress that it assesses short-run
effects that were measured in the 3rd quarter of 2015, the year in which the min-
imum wage was introduced. As the effects of the minimum wage may – or may
not – emerge in a longer-term adjustment period, we recommend further studies on
this issue in the long-run. Such a long-run analysis would complement our results
by capturing lagged training adjustments that should be equally important to policy
makers. We also suggest supplementary analyses that look at the individual level inde-
pendent of the workplace dimension. It is possible that the minimum wage affects
human capital accumulation outside the workplace, which is neglected in our firm-
level analysis. We further encourage an analysis that relates minimum wage effects on
training to employment effects. It seems plausible that a reduction of costs (through
a decline in employer-financed training) has helped to maintain the size of the
workforce.
Endnotes
1 Such exemptions include young employees until 18 years of age, apprentices, intern-
ships with a maximal duration of 3 months, long-term unemployment during the
first 6 months of a subsequent employment, and volunteers. Until the end of 2017
already existing sectoral minimum wages were allowed to undercut the new statutory
minimum wage.
2A detailed graphical description of this concept is presented in the figure of
Additional file 1.
3Comprehensive descriptions of the IAB Establishment Panel are provided by Fischer
et al. (2009) or Ellguth et al. (2014).
4 In a comparison of the survey sample with the population of all establishments in
Germany, Bossler et al. (2017) do not detect any meaningful selectivity in the survey
response.
5 In panel years before 2014, respondents were allowed to report the num-
ber of training measures instead of trained employees. This alternative report-
ing option was used by approximately 15% of the establishments and causes an
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inconsistency within these years but also across time. We impute the number of
trained employees for such cases using the procedure by Stegmaier (2012) and
Hinz (2016). However, an exclusion of such observations of the waves 2011, 2012
and 2013 from our analysis sample does not cause any significant changes to
our results.
6We report inference based on standard errors clustered at the establishment level.
7 The test statistic of the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test is 26,958.89 (p value
0.0000). Hence, the null hypothesis of zero firm-level variation is clearly rejected. The
chi-squared test statistic of the Hausman test is 54.13 (p-value 0.0000). This rejection
implies that firm-specific effects are correlated with time-varying observables pointing at
the importance of fixed effect estimation.
8 Results of these non-linear estimations are available on request.
9 Training at a specific workplace can comprise all three types of training.
10We use a radius matching procedure as this equalizes trends, see Panel b of Fig. 1.
While other matching procedures such as the kernel matching or nearest neighbor
matching allow us to replicate the treatment effects, they fail to equalize trends from a
visual inspection.
11 The results are robust to alternative sizes of the caliper. Setting the caliper to values
ranging between 0.01 and 0.06 yields point estimates ranging between −0.02 and −0.03.
12We use a distinction by sectors based on the results by Bachmann and Frings (2017)
who estimate the extent of sector-specific monopsony power from elasticities of job-to-
job transitions. Based on their results, all manufacturing sectors are competitive, whereas
among the services, wholesale, retailing, hotels and restaurants, and other services, non-
industrial organizations, and the public services are characterized by a high extend of
monopsony power.
13 The case of financial constraints is discussed by Acemoglu and Pischke (2003).
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